Install the latest version of libv8 manually, libv8-3.8.9.20 at the time of writing this:
apt-get install libv8-3.8.9.20
Download the nodejs package sources, dependencies and build them:
cd
apt-get source nodejs
apt-get build-dep nodejs
cd nodejs-*
debuild -nc -uc
If you encounter build-dependency errors, you should try first to lower the
dependency in debian/control, both in Build-Depends and in Depends and re-run
debuild. If the build fails (e.g. with undefined reference to 'ev_run') the
previous version is missing required functions. So, you must install the
updated versions of the required dependencies (e.g. libev4) from sid, using
apt-get install name=version e.g. libev4=1:4.11-1. I suggest this because
you’ll have to manually update packages installed from sid, so the lesser, the
best.
So you have a Linux VM you use for development, because you want to mirror the
production environment as closely as possible. You have many applications to
deal with, they have to be running at the same time because they are nifty REST
JSON web services.
You are very tired to remember which one you put on port 8081, and your
configuration files slowly become a real mess. So you set up IP address aliases
in for the network interface and decide to assign even host names –
/etc/hosts is just fine – for each app.
Then, in such a setup, why would you still need to run them on ports higher
than 1024? Wouldn’t be just great to type the application name in the browser
address bar? Indeed it is, but it’s better to not run them as root, anyway.
The solution are Linux
capabilities
(see also here
). The one that
interests us is cap_net_bind_service: it gives a process the right to bind
well-known ports (< 1024). If you use an interpreted language, of course you’ll
have to add the capability to the interpreter itself. That’s why there’s
development in the title of this article – you should not set this up on a
production server, if you don’t know what you are doing.
One final quirk: if you happen to dlopen() shared objects that dynamically
link towards libraries outside the canonical paths, you cannot load them via
LD_LIBRARY_PATH (e.g. the SYBASE.sh) as it is ignored for setcap-ped
processes. You should better move the library paths into an /etc/ld.so.conf.d
snippet.
tl;dr
Assuming you are the latest and greatest rails developer, you should become
root – or use sudo, as you wish – and
# YOU ARE ON YOUR DEVELOPMENT MACHINEsetcap cap_net_bind_service+ep `which ruby`
Profit:
thin start -a yourapp -p 80>> Using rack adapter
>> Thin web server (v1.2.11 codename Bat-Shit Crazy)>> Maximum connections set to 1024>> Listening on yourapp:80, CTRL+C to stop
...
“If it is good, they stop making it”, the
payoff printed on the conference necklaces, distributed to every participant,
along with an über-l33t badge customized with our nickname and the key
hash.
Being my first experience at an international security conf (I’ve only been
to the ccc2k+7 camp), and being a ph outsider ‘cause I never participated
to previous editions, the boot keynote held by FX, staffer and frontman, has been
enlightening: “you ought to be here!”, he yelled while pointing at
the stage, wearing a white shirt with the Phenoelit logo printed on both
arms.
“This conference has never started on time”, he continued,
“so there was no reason to do that for this last one”. the schedule
is straightforward: party, the next days talks from 12.00PM to 7.30PM, then
party, and the last days talks from 12.00PM to 5.30PM. definitely a setup
well-playing with the available alcohol :-D.
Afterwards, another speaker informed us that the wi-fi access keys we
received at the registration allows us to use a 6 APs/3 repeaters beast driven
by an OpenBSD box – they want the audience to hack it because, well,
“you are the Worst Case Scenario.” :-)
Then, the funny Hacker Hacker video was presented:
:-D
After a lousy and not so exciting first night (due to tiredness), we’ll wait
and see what the next day would bring.
High capacity sniffers used in big cos and on border national gateways that
collect user generated traffic on order to find possibly “criminal”
patterns are today generally available for bandwidth to the 10Gbps, there will
be soon appliances that’ll process streams of 100Gbps. Sniffjoke, by vecna and evilaliv3 is a tool that can inject into
TCP connections outsider packets that will fool the
intercepting sniffer but with no remarkable effect on the receiver. these
packets for instance trick the sniffer into thinking that the connection has
been reset even it is not true – by injecting a wrong-checksummed RST or a packet with a TTL less
than 1 of the hop count – or try to consume its processing power by using
known vendor-specific interpretations of the TCP RFC.
Details: website, slides, wireshark
thread.
Did you ever woder what happens when the wireless network password is
directly tied to the device MAC address, from which
it can be inferred because it is part of the essid? horror stories, as the an
Austrian (ViBi) and a German (5M7X) researchers showed us. many carriers
who sell wifi equipment ship it with similar vulnerabilities, as also mayhem
and cyrax show us in this
video (italian only)
We’re talking about a technology whose potential is not maximized, as
a result leads to flawed the security measures, because of bad engineering and
misleading instructions: some wifi apparatus manuals even recommended the user
to never fiddle with the configuration and leave the default passwords in
place. clever. Other examples of bad engineering include making the network
key the last 4 bytes of the internal eth MAC address
and then broadcasting that MAC via a multicast packet
sent to 224.0.1.0 (Samsung
G3200 / G2210 / G3220).
Other companies, such as the synchron who produce the easybox
has a patented way to provide a key recognition method, and direct
correspondence between the mac and the key seed. eventually, there are even
companies who sell their devices with the management SSHD open on the external interface, and who base the
network key entirely on the internal MAC. Couple it
with default passwords and you get the picture.
If you want to know more, you should get some armory and either reverse engineer the
algorithms yourself, or participate to security conferences and ask the
researchers for the slides :-). Once the industry will be ready, all the
details will be revealed.
Hacking TETRA
Held by Harald Welte (@laf0rge),
member of the gnumonks.de crew, the talk
described a terrestrial radio communication technology that is similar to GSM but runs on lower frequencies of the spectrum, thus
achieving wider coverage with less transceivers. TETRA employs ways to authenticate and encrypt
communications, features a signaling channel over 140-chars messages are
exchanged and identifies each user on the network using the match between the
subscriber number and the terminal one.
TETRA is widely deployed over the world as a
communication medium for public transport, public safety, firefighters, etc. it
is a technology suitable for these uses, but laforge correctly reminded us that
even if the tools allow us to implement secure networks, often the
implementations of such tools is ineffective and prone to breakage.
He showed us how the signaling on the network works. He started by first
showing us packet dumps in wireshark, thanks to chinese hackers who wrote the
dissectors. He was also able to associate to a tetra network used by BVG, the german public transportation system, and listen to
a call between the headquarters and all train drivers: the former was asking
the latters to push a button contemporarily. Yes, sir: in the 21st century you
still need people to do that. Awesome. If you want to build your own, you
should first learn how radio communication works, buy yourself a FUNcube dongle and check out the OsmocomTETRA project. An introduction is
available on heise.de.
Printer Hacking
Find vulnerability into a printer management interface, write a java applet
that exploits it, define hooks to drive it from Javascript, and your web-based
printer vulnerability scanner is done!
I missed the first part of the talk, so I don’t have the details, but
as the speaker told me later when I asked him how it all fitted together,
“it’s everything on the paper!” so just RTFMhere
:)
Moving on in the list of badly-implemented technologies, nowadays credit /
debit cards are vulnerable to a typical downgrade attack when it comes to
validating the PIN. There are different types of
chips, ones that only allow plaintext authentication between the POS and the chip, others that employ a challenge-response
mechanism, and almost every one of them allow the PIN
to be validated online with the bank.
No matter what, the SIM exposes an interface to
the card readers, that can be queried and whose communication can be
eavesdropped by an intercepting device. Because cards must be
backwards-compatible with existing POSes and viceversa, such an intercepting
device is able to alter the advertised capabilities of the card and force the
POS to use plaintext authentication, and then
intercepting the pin as the user types it.
Such a skimmer is a 4×4cm device, that can be installed
inside a POS or an ATM, thus
possibly going unnoticed for a long period of time. And even if there are
insurances that cover you against these frauds, if you’re a frequent
traveller, you can hard time in demonstrating you were a victim, both because
the card number and pin match, and because this is now considered as a
“secure” technology that cannot be broken.
Thanks to Andrea Barisani and Davide Bianco for making us aware of the
downgrade flaw. If you want to know more, here are their slide published on
their company site, inversepath.com.
As years go by, stack smashing is still alive and powerful, as argp explained during his talk. CVE-2008-3531 is a known vulnerability of the FreeBSD
kernel that allows code execution in kernel space, whilst the UMA – FreeBSD’s memory allocator – has known
flaws in it as well.
Without going into deeper details, the main issue here is the “if it
ain’t broken, don’t fix it” approach employed by many system
administrators when it comes to production machines: as a result, they do not
get updated for years. Maybe it’s not broken today (if ever, ya’now
0dayz?) but it will be broken tomorrow, and you’ll get pwned if you do
not keep up to date. WORD.
Advances in win32 ASLR evasion
When I think about Microsoft products, I always feel that they’re not
built to be used by people, because it looks to me that coders who write them
never care about using them in the first place. They do not eat
their own dog food. just go on and try to use IE developer tools and
you’ll get the point.
Their software is written for business, it must match some higher-order
requirement agreed by some random manager 7 layers up in the hierarchy, and
very often it fails to implement them correctly. Thus, as JF pointed out during the talk
“Microsoft has spent a lot of money fixing the exploitation problem, but
they only created more of them”. Word, dword and qword! :-)
ASLR is a mitigating factor for exploits that assume
the return address of vulnerable code lies in at a well-known address in
memory. These locations are used to compute where to write the shellcode in
order to trigger its execution after exploitation. If the return address gets
randomized (thus Address Space Layout Randomization), then the exploit will
just crash the vulnerable software by making it reference an address outside
its space.
Problem is that, for some obscure side effect, for each 16 threads you
create, if their base address is even (0x02xxxxxx,
0x04xxxxxx), 13 of them will end up being based at a known
location, thus making ASLR ineffective and bypassed.
PWN!
Check JF slides out here
– thanks for sharing @not_me!
JF apologized at least 4 times before ending up closing its laptop and
ending the presentation with vodka and gin, because he said that he did not do
a good work in explaining but, as I also told him later, he was more than
effective: it’s not easy at all to understand how all the side effects
played together. Only he that was on this stuff for months was able to see the
patterns in addresses and convey a successful exploitation of an ASLR-protected process. Enlightening!
I’m no MM guy and I didn’t get most of the concepts of the talk,
but its abstract is very explanatory:
Heap memory management has matured over time, but with
complex new code comes new opportunity for exploitation. This presentation will
focus on understanding the Low Fragmentation heap on Windows 7 (32-bit). After
a foundation of integral concepts is laid, new exploitation techniques will be
thoroughly discussed. Finally, we will use this new found knowledge to leverage
supposed non-exploitable vulnerabilities. Specifically we will
cover a case study showing how to craft an exploit for the IIS FTP 7.5 denial of service (http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2010/12/22/assessing-an-iis-ftp-7-5-=
unauthenticated-denial-of-service-vulnerability.aspx-=
unauthenticated-denial-of-service-vulnerability.aspx), resulting in full
control of EIP.
What is interesting is that in order to use a memory allocation optimization
subsystem to do what you want, you have to mix and match 7 different attack
primitives, understand thoroughly how the block allocations are made and how
they interact with the host CPU. As well as battle
with all the side effects in order to write in the program counter the address
you want to execute. “@You say JMP, we say what
addr@”, a T-shirt was correctly stating in front of me. :-)
Incredibly complicated as it sounds, Chris Valasek was able to find,
exploit and explain the vulnerabilities, with a mental exercise that is both
brilliant than inspirating: always dig deeper, and you’ll be able to
reach any goal.
Exploiting the Hard-Working DWARF: Trojans with
no Native Executable Code
Could you ever imagine that in every GCC-compiled
binary may lie a complete virtual machine subsystem, that gets invoked on every
call/ret and has the ability to read and write the heap and every cpu register?
indeed it is, and it’s called DWARF, a
debugging instrumentation used by GDB to help the
developer debug his/her software.
What’s interesting is also that DWARF code
is not considered by analysis tools as being part of the object code of a
binary, thus making it an injection vector to attach trojans to a binary.
Moreover, DWARF is platform and architecture
independent, being a finite-state machine on its own: a DWARF-based trojan can be used over multiple platforms and
attached to any ELF binary.
If DWARF code is present, it gets executed for
each function called and on each return, as the stack gets unwinded, and yes
you can read and write the CPU and on the heap. Neat.
For all the details, check the whitepaper
out.
Here we see an example of hobby-ism and poor project management on the GCC side – no offense intended of course – but
such a crafted and complex subsystem ends up being available in the vast
majority of OSs, possibly making up an infection vector.
I infer this because DWARF is an obscure,
undocumented, cargo-culted piece of code written because somehow today and
tomorrow the GDB devs needed instrumentations, and
GCC devs built in an excessively powerful tool to
support them, but said tool can then be abused and no one really know how the
first releases work – unless you skim through random posts on the GCC mailing list. More recent releases are pretty
documented, though.
Funnily enough, I think to support GDB, even the
LLVM compiler
infrastructure, built with clean design from the ground up, uses DWARF! That said, the moral of the story is that ugly hacks
today, will call you for trouble tomorrow – or the next day.
- “hey man, are you the guy behind the openbsd box acting
as an host AP for the ph wifi network?” - “yeah, I
am” - “may I ask you a root shell?” - “you
want… WHAT?” - “yeah, you
know, I’d like to issue ifconfig, brconfig,
pfctl -s, ls -lrt /etc | tail, stuff like that
– just to see how the thing works :)”
Kudos to the OpenBSD panda, that didn’t give me a shell, but
illustrated me how the dorepanda access point “cluster” works,
creating a network that spans all the 802.11b/g and n spectrums. It load
balances clients between the APs, using cryptography to verify the AP identity
and trying to prevent eavesdropping.
- “man, you are actually a grey beard at a security
conference!” - ”... so what?!”
... and then you talk with a 20-yrs experienced DBA that tells you “Oracle is flawed by
design” and you chat with him about how the security scenario has
changed over the years.
- “nothing really changed, it just got more complicated
along the way” - “you mean, the bottom line is always you have
to snatch some shellcode in memory and then find a mean to execute
it?” - “exactly – you may have an NX bit, ASLR and canaries, but there’s alway a way around
it.”
A good sysadm friend of mine told me
similarly, in terms of “as long as I read enough documentation, I’m
able to set up and deploy whatever system. no challenges anymore.”
To me, confs like this one make you wonder, think and activate mental
circuitry that stimulate your passion: you see brilliant humans solving tricky
problems, walking deeply into details and actually learning new things in the
process. human beings whose model of the world includes sequences of
interactions happening inside the machine. Like a skilled netadmin recognizes
AS numbers from netblocks, a kernel hacker learns to recognize portions of the
address space: he/she literally breathes within the operating system.
It amazes me how I found strong matches of Jeff Hawkins’ theory of
intelligence (TED video) in hackers’ minds. I talked about the
HTMspaper to the folks I
met, and I was surprised no one of them knew about a technology aimed at
building intelligent machines by reimplementing the human brain’s
cortical algorithm in silicon. For instance, Chris Valasek and JF talks
demonstrate the basis of expertise: more and more you receive inputs from a
context, the more your brain will be able to see deeper and complicated
patterns, because they get moved lower in the cortex hierarchy, whose job is to
recognize details – as they did with ASLR and
the low-fragmentation heap.
- “sir, you are the only one wearing a tie in this
hall” - ”...” - “so you must definitely work
for Microsoft!” - “ahem, no…” - “ah, ok
so my assumption was incorrect. sorry for bothering! :D”
At 5:15, it’s really better to get to bed, waiting for the next good
morning!
After such a party, both the social engineering and
Exploit
Next Generation++ talks were a bit foggy, I ever failed to recognized the
metasploit source code language (ahem). :-)
Then shirtie (@skjortan) on stage
illustrated how you can use a Bayesian / MAXENT classifier to identify unknown, 0day
malware.
Exactly like an anti-spam filter catches spam by first analyzing a training
set, identifying the recurring patterns and then matching them with novel data,
malware as well as spam has typical features that can be used to find it. For
instance, the presence of a reference to the CreateProcess API or
the absence of the <a
href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pentium_FDIV_bug">_check_fdiv</a>
one, to whether the binary is UPX-packed or not.
The technology looks effective, it is not a replacement of a signature-based
AV rather it is an augmentation, because it is prone to false positives, but it
is the only that identifies unknown, 0-day malware – the one for which no
signatures exist.
Offensive XSLT
XSLT is a language used to transform XML documents into another form, and it is a
turing-complete language executed either in the server or in the client
context. it is used both by content management systems and in client-side
applications, the most prominent example being the index of a subversion
repository.
Because XSLT is a (functional) programming language, it offers
means to read and write files and to execute code. If the user input is not
sanitized and/or the XSLT engine exposed, it can be
used to pwn a machine. Of course, the abusable features can be turned off if
they’re not needed, or alternatively wrapped with a secure API if they are. Check Nicolas Gregoire’s slides out here. Liferay users,
you’ve
been warned :-)
Final words
Thanks @nhaima for telling me about
the conf and allowing me to have a grant (thanks nobody :)
Thanks @techdoer for editing the
post – hopefully this is my first one without grammar errors :-D
Thanks @phenoelit and @41414141 for organizing the party
(you’re da men), everyone who was there. I hope to see you soon on stage
:). Yay!
Thanks to @jodosha
efforts and praising the
former Javaday event, now renamed into codemotion
that brought in Rome many Ruby developers from Milan, Padua and other parts of
Italy – the first official Ruby Social Club in Rome has been a great success.
Of course, officialty is measured only in the amount of twitter spam
posted about it! :-): earlier RSCs in Rome go back in time to
2006
organized by current mikamai
members and more meetups
promoted by @jekoin
2007
.
What matters is that there’s a community, there’s a passion, and there’s love
to share knowledge - no matter who holds the meetings, the important thing is
that they’re being held :-).
The event was simple and direct - some beers first, then my keynote on RVM and
Ruby interpreters, then Luca’s one announcing his
minege.ms
project and after real social networking
:-). I met @gravityblast
after much time we
didn’t meet, knew the PIP
group and met
@svarione
,
@punkmanit
,
@leonardoperna
,
@riggasconi
,
@ogeidix
and other smart people. Moreover, we
spent quite some nice time together, making up a really lousy and funny
week-end. Of course, huge kudos to @nhaima
’s car
- that tirelessly carried us around Rome for two days :-)
Now, looking forward to the next meetup, thanks everyone who participed,
who offered me beers and, last but not least, thanks to
@etapeta
for bringing me in time at the meeting -
you’re the real hero :-).
I spent the last two days trying to set up the Aluminium Mac Mini (rev. 4,1)
as a home NAS server with encrypted storage, and I
wanted a BSD system on it. There’s already an
embedded OpenBSD onto the soekris gateway, and another companion would have
been nice. :-)
FreeBSD 8.2-RC1 boots but, due to the same bug, doesn’t recognize any
SATA drive nor any USB
umass device;
NetBSD 5.1 boots fine, handles SATA disks via the generic pciide driver (no DMA, thus quite slow) but, unluckily, doesn’t handle
the BCM57762 ethernet controller. I tried with quick
and dirty patches to bring the
bge driver up to date with -current, but still no luck: the MII link detection works, the card transmits but
doesn’t receive. The sdmmc controller as well works with -current but not
with 5.1-RELEASE. ACPI works correctly;
OpenBSD 4.8 boots, can access the SATA drives
without DMA, and recognizes the bge network card, but
exposes the very same behaviour as NetBSD 5.1 with the -current driver fitted
in;
DragonFlyBSD 2.8.2 doesn’t even enter kernel mode, I suspect
due to ACPI bugs;
PureDarwin didn’t
inspire me too much, due to the many blocking issues.
All of them support encrypted storage, I built up a NetBSD CGD disk flawlessly onto dk wedges; FreeBSD has got the
interesting gbde(8) and
geli(8) GEOM-based tools that I wasn’t able to test, while OpenBSD
supports crypto via a softraid
personality. Unluckily, support for the, nowadays, exotic Apple hardware is
a no-brainer.
So, with no other way left open, I decided to go the Linux route, using the
excellent sysresccd, that I elect today as
the successor of the pld-linux
rescuecd, companion of endless system recoveries :-). Anyway, you’ll
need the 2.6.36 kernel to make it boot onto the MacMini4,1, due to the
aforementioned MCP89 bug. Ethernet card and SD card
reader work out-of-the-box.
Now, I’m playing with LUKS and, while I’m not that competent in
cryptography, looks like it is more evolved than the *BSD counterparts, and
anyway it is more versatile tool than the tools in OpenBSD and NetBSD. On the
latter, having to set up GPT and DK Wedges to make
the CGD and synch MBR and
Disklabel to make the boot loader work (yuck!), everything coupled with rEFIt
is quite a mess™. There’s a GPT loader for NetBSD but I hadn’t a chance to
try it out.
I hope this information is useful to anyone who tries a similar adventure,
comments are appreciated :-).
